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1. Judicial structure overview 
In Hungary a four-level judicial system operates. The system is unitary, i.e. there are no 
specialized courts outside of the ordinary courts. There is a horizontal division of labor amongst 
judges in each court. This kind of division of labor is reflected in the horizontal organization of 
the judicial administration: in higher courts criminal, civil, economic as well as administrative 
and labor judicial departments operate. The departments organize and support judges 
adjudicating in one of the aforementioned branches of the law. 
The Curia of Hungary is the highest judicial authority in Hungary. It decides appeals and 
reviews final decisions of lower courts if these are challenged through an extraordinary remedy 
(the Curia has no right to select the cases to be dealt with). Besides, the Curia publishes 
judgements and delivers ‘uniformity decisions’ in order to guarantee the coherence of the 
judicial practice at national level. Uniformity decisions are binding for all courts. 
The President of the National Office for the Judiciary (NOJ) who is elected by the 
Parliament carries out the functions of central administration of the courts under a weak 
supervision of a self-elected body of the judiciary called National Committee of Justices 
(NCJ). 
As for the current issues, there is an “evergreen” problem, namely the timeliness of the 
administration of justice and the case-backlog accumulated before 2012. A similar problem is 
that there have been regions in the country (Budapest and the Central Region of Hungary) which 
have been tackling with disproportionally high workload. This situation was worsened in 
2012, when the legislation forced to retire almost 300 senior judges. In the past few years the 
NOJ initiated some amendments to the law in force and organizational changes aiming at 
speeding up the court procedure. As many figures show this effort has proven to be successful. 
Quality of judgments and understandability of judicial writing is a growing concern amongst 
judges and court leaders. 
 
1. Classical judicial evaluation arrangements 
Evaluation of individual judges - In Hungary usually the first step to become a judge is to work 
as a judge trainee within the judicial system (after graduating from a law school). Although 
according to the law, every person who passed the Bar Exam can apply for judgeship, the 
figures show that the vast majority of successful applicants start their judicial career as judge 
trainees. Lack of work experience outside the judicial administration can be a point of criticism.  
In the selection procedure of judge trainees and judges there is a growing emphasis on skills 
and competences (besides legal knowledge). There are some statutory criteria that determine 
the ranking of applicants. The minister in charge of the judicial system issued the number of 
points to be awarded for each of the criterion. The key actors in selection and appointment are 
the Local Judicial Council, the president of the affected court and the President of the NOJ. 
Another point of criticism may be that it is the judges’ perspective that dominates the selection 
process, and societal expectations toward prospective judges do not exert significant influence 
on it.  
Judge trainees and apprentice judges have compulsory in-service trainings held by mostly 
senior judges focusing on competences such as understandability of judicial writing and legal 
knowledge. A new development is that each apprentice judge has an “instructor” judge who 
supervises her work (while respecting the independence of the supervised judge).  
Judges are assessed firstly in the third and secondly in the sixth years from their appointment 
and after that in every eighth year. The assessment is conducted usually by the head of the 
affected department (who knows the assessed judge personally). She evaluates the quality of 
the assessed judge’s work from three aspects: the quantitative and the qualitative aspect of 
the judicial work as well as judicial skills are taken into consideration (a detailed list of 
assessment criteria exists). According to the relevant law and regulation the proportion of the 
quashed/changed judgments of the assessed judge is not an explicit quality indicator, but in 
practice it may have an impact on the outcome of the evaluation. If the result of the evaluation 
is ‘incompetent’, the judge must be dismissed (legal remedy exists against that decision). It can 
be said that evaluation of judges is also dominated by the perspective of judges (for example, 
parties’ satisfaction does not play any role in the evaluation). Besides, evaluation conducted by 
the immediate superior of the assessed judge can threaten judicial independence. 
Court leader positions are filled by the way of an application procedure. The key players of this 
process are the presidents of regional courts (in cases of lower court leaders) and the President 
of the NOJ (in cases of all other court leaders). Court presidents are not managers, they are 
judges, but managerial trainings are organised for them by the NOJ. It is hardly a positive 
phenomenon that a great proportion of the application procedures were declared unsuccessful 
by the President of the NOJ (in 2015 almost 20%, in 2016 36% of all calls). Some consider this 
tendency a sign of an increasing central control over court leaders. 
 
Evaluation of court activities - In Hungary a heavy emphasis is put on monitoring the activity 
of courts. The evaluation is highly centralized: the aim of the evaluation is to meet those long-
term strategic objectives (primarily effectiveness and productivity) that were established by the 
President of the NOJ, and the indicators were determined at the national level. The evaluation 
process is characterized by a ‘statistical approach’ which shows that courts work under strict 
control. A wide range of information on the activity of courts is collected at the court level and 
sent to the NOJ on a monthly basis. This information encompasses the number of incoming and 
resolved cases, the backlog (special attention is paid to the “old cases” that are pending over 
two years before courts) and the workload (case/judge) of courts, appeal and reversal rates, and 
data on the length of judicial proceedings. 
External actors are involved to a very limited extent in the process of court evaluation: the use 
of customer satisfaction surveys is in its infancy.  
Recently, new methods for workload measurement have been developed: case weights and so-
called ratio tables have been introduced. Case weights are used in the process of case allocation 
and aim to make the workload of judges within one court more balanced. The figures of ratio 
tables (incoming cases per authorized judicial staff in each court) provide information about 
the workload of courts and are meant to be used when decisions need to be made on staff 
allocation (filling vacancies). The Hungarian judiciary is constantly facing the problem of huge 
workload imbalances between the central region and other parts of the country: the primary tool 
for reducing pressure on judges adjudicating in courts belonging to the central region is judicial 
secondment.  
There is no direct link between court evaluation and the allocation of financial resources. Only 
temporary national projects provide some extra resources for well-performing courts. It is the 
court president who bears responsibility for the performance of the court. The president of the 
court can be subjected to disciplinary proceedings in case of serious malfunctions in the court. 
 
Resources allocation to courts -The annual budget of the court system in 2017 is cca. 321 
millions of euros which is 0,67 percent of the annual state budget. Though in the last few years 
there has been a slight increase in the amount of the budget of the court system, budgetary 
support for Hungarian courts is rather low compared to the general European level. 
The budget of the courts is a separate “chapter” within the state budget in Hungary. The 
‘external’ budgeting (i.e. the determination of the main figures) is formally the task of the 
President of the NOJ, who prepares the budget plan independently from the government. 
However, de facto it is determined mainly by the previous year’s budget (‘base approach’), 
the political bargains behind the scenes, and other determinations, like, that more than 70% of 
the total budget is spent on salaries, and taxes.   
The allocation of the freely expendable resources (vacant positions, and some 20% of the 
budget) within the organisation (‘internal budgeting’) is nearly entirely in the hand of the 
President of the NOJ. She is deciding on the filling or the reallocation of the vacant positions, 
as well as all other minor budgetary issues, like renovations, extra remuneration etc.  
 
2. Innovative practices 
1) As a recent development in Hungarian courts a mentor-judge network operates. Junior 
judges that need legal-professional support may turn to senior judges registered as “mentors”. 
Unfortunately, we have no data on the number of junior judges who use this opportunity.  
2) Since 2012 a special organization is functioning under the umbrella of NCJ, the network of 
EU law consultant judges. Their main task is the consultation Locally in legal matters 
affected by EU law. This system is not only a tool for improving the judges’ performance, but 
is also gives a territorial and per court overview on the everyday EU legal problems of the 
courts as well. 
3) In 2013 a jurisprudence-analysis group was set up to deliver inquiries into the drafting 
practice of the Curia judges in civil and administrative cases. A similar group was created in 
criminal matters a year later. Since the structure of decisions and their linguistic and stylistic 
level varied from one judge to another to a great extent, the objectives of the working group 
were to improve the drafting-style, the uniformity and the comprehensibility of judgments 
in order to meet the expectations of the general public. Their report suggested, inter alia, the 
standardization of the description of the subject-matters of the cases, the rationalization of citing 
previous decisions, the introduction of an internal numbering to the reasoning part, or 
compliance with the linguistic demands of the heterogeneous target audience. The report also 
proposed some changes on the substance of the reasoning, but some of them – for instance, 
avoiding reference to legal literature or the establishment of novel legal doctrines, and 
refraining from addressing the parties’ arguments which do not affect the decision – were highly 
surprising. The “Stylebook” which contains some samples for drafting was published only on 
the intranet of the judiciary in 2016. The ‘Stylebook’ is not a compulsory tool. 
4) In recent years, a new strategy aiming to improve the timeliness and the quality of 
adjudication has been developed in the District Court of Debrecen in cases belonging to the 
criminal branch. The project was launched in the early 2014 in a bottom-up way and is built 
on three pillars: (1) timely and effective administration of justice, (2) staff satisfaction and (3) 
customer satisfaction. The project targeted a comprehensive change in the attitude of the staff, 
in all segments of the functioning of the court. A novel method of case allocation was introduced 
to provide incentives for judges to complete cases and make their work more effective. The 
former scheme was based on the system of “case equalization” in the level of individual judges: 
each judge had to deal with the same number of cases which meant that judges were not 
motivated to resolve cases as the more cases they resolved, the more they got. This scheme was 
replaced by a case allocation system which builds on the idea that judges receive the average 
number of incoming cases in every month with special emphasis on the different difficulty of 
the cases to be assigned (the guiding principle is “equal number of cases with equal weight”). 
Besides, a complex motivational system has also been elaborated which is directly linked to 
the performance of the judges. Statistical data reveal that the number of cases pending over 2 
years has dropped significantly since the model was introduced, namely from 8,6 % to 2,79% 
in a two-year time. 
 
  
 
